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he Greek crisis has raised doubts about the sustainability of European Monetary Union. 
Greece has taken significant adjustment measures. The Eurogroup decision to provide 
financial support if necessary goes in the right direction. However, such measures may 
not be enough to deal with the risk of instability in the longer term. Other imbalances, most 
notably the current account imbalances within EMU, need to be addressed to avoid a deflation 
spiral that would aggravate sustainability problems in highly indebted countries. The Greek 
crisis highlights the need to take steps to strengthen the economic governance of the euro area. 
A key component of these steps will be a stronger, growth-oriented surveillance.  
If the fiscal position in one or more euro area members deteriorates, their financing will take 
place at increasing costs, if at all, and contagion could spread to the euro area as a whole. In 
some cases, debt might not be sustainable and would have to be restructured. The first step 
towards stronger economic governance therefore is to insure debt sustainability. This task lies 
foremost with countries that have to implement the right policies. Incentives to do so, however, 
may not be available and this, in turn, requires both an effective and credible surveillance 
mechanism and the necessary resources to support crisis resolution. 
An unsustainable debt position can be the result of two quite different mechanisms. The first is a 
protracted lack of fiscal discipline in an otherwise weak economy, as in the Greek case. The 
second one is the (Spanish) case where a prolonged period of fiscal discipline was reversed as a 
consequence of the collapse of growth, itself the result of an unsustainable private sector growth 
mechanism. In both cases, the debt/GDP ratio has taken on a rising dynamics although for 
different reasons. So a more effective system of surveillance will have to monitor both the 
dynamics of debt and the sustainability of GDP growth. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
as we know it, partly takes the first aspect into consideration and neglects the second. So the 
SGP should be modified accordingly. One way to do this is to consider the composition of 
public spending and taxation when judging countries’ fiscal positions. Some spending items 
(such as education and R&D) are more growth-oriented than others and some taxes (such as 
carbon tax or a consumption tax) are less harmful to growth. Both should be protected when a 
government embarks on fiscal consolidation.  
T 
 
C o m m e n t a r y  
Countries with a weak fiscal position tend to run current account deficits, which need to be 
financed, and as this process becomes unsustainable market confidence deteriorates. Current 
account deficits however are also the result of deteriorating competitiveness, which is reflected 
in appreciating real exchange rates. In the euro area, relative competitive positions have been 
diverging in tandem with widening current account imbalances. Again there is scope for a 
stronger surveillance to insure that deficit countries take measures to improve their 
competitiveness by addressing the underlying causes of rising inflation and declining 
productivity, for example through appropriate wage policies and structural reforms. On the other 
hand, I see no rationale, nor any benefit for the euro area, in prescribing surplus countries to 
slow or even revert their productivity growth. On the contrary, surplus countries should make 
efforts to increase their productivity growth. This would address the issue of current account 
imbalances as follows. A current account surplus is the result, other things being equal, of 
excess savings over investment. Such excess savings partly reflect structural determinants, 
hence they should be addressed through structural measures. In some cases, such as in China, a 
very high savings rate signals the need to reform the welfare system and the financial system, so 
as to decrease savings in households and state-owned enterprises. In the euro area the obvious 
case is Germany, where, however, the main goal should be to increase investment. This could 
be obtained by liberalising (and thus increasing productivity in) the service sector, which 
remains largely protected from foreign competition and where more competition would spur 
innovation. In parallel, deficit countries should implement reforms that would increase savings 
such as increasing retirement age. 
In sum, an important step towards better economic governance in the euro area would be the 
creation of a stronger surveillance mechanism that would focus on: fiscal sustainability, growth 
sustainability, competitiveness and structural determinants of current imbalances. Adjustment in 
such variables clearly requires time and a financing mechanism to smooth the process. But this 
is what a monetary union is about. To implement this mechanism, the European Commission 
should be given a mandate to extend and intensify surveillance activities. In addition a financial 
facility for programme lending should be established on a permanent basis (and not just on an 
ad hoc basis as in the case for Greece). The combination of these two factors would be the 
equivalent of a European Monetary Fund with a minimum of institutional change.  
A necessary additional factor, however, is effective enforcement of surveillance 
recommendations to maximise crisis-prevention benefits. Would a stronger peer review 
mechanism suffice to complement the disciplining pressure of markets? Hopefully so, but 
enforcement mechanisms require carrots and sticks, especially when the economic situation 
risks veering off track. In a world where imbalances persist over time, debt levels will be higher 
almost everywhere, and market financing is a permanent factor and hence where credibility is 
essential, the stick is tough conditionality (based on strengthened surveillance) and the carrot is 
the availability of emergency financing.  
Conversely, suggesting that euro area members facing a debt crisis should be invited to leave 
monetary union could imply much higher costs than benefits. A number of practical problems 
arise. For example, exiting the euro means reintroducing a national currency, a process that 
takes significant time and effort. How would such a process be managed while dealing with a 
crisis? Second, under what conditions should the exit be requested (imposed, negotiated)? It is 
not at all obvious that debt sustainability would improve after the massive devaluation of the 
new currency (with respect, say, to euro entry rates). Last but not least, what about contagion, 
and the loss of credibility for the euro area as a whole? One could go on with other questions, 
but I leave it to the proponents of the exit option to bring forward convincing arguments.  
